研究目的
To propose a new countermeasure against side-channel attacks in differential-quadrature-phase shift (DQPS) QKD systems by monitoring coincident clicks to reveal detector blinding and control attacks.
研究成果
The proposed scheme of monitoring coincident clicks in DQPS-QKD systems is feasible and effective for detecting side-channel attacks like detector blinding and control attacks. It requires no modification to the system configuration and is easy to implement.
研究不足
The feasibility of obtaining a sufficient number of coincident counts in long-distance systems where the mean photon number received by Bob is small.
1：Experimental Design and Method Selection:
The study proposes monitoring coincident clicks in DQPS-QKD systems to detect side-channel attacks.
2：Sample Selection and Data Sources:
Uses coherent pulse trains with phase modulation to simulate Alice's signal in DQPS-QKD systems.
3：List of Experimental Equipment and Materials:
Includes a laser source, intensity modulator, variable attenuator, beam splitter, single-photon detectors (APD-based SPDs), and a time interval analyzer.
4：Experimental Procedures and Operational Workflow:
The signal light is attenuated, split, and detected by SPDs. Detection times and which detector clicked are recorded.
5：Data Analysis Methods:
Coincident counts are analyzed to detect eavesdropping.
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